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  • This paper investigates the ways in which parties stake out left-right positions that deviate from the mean positions of their supporters. Previous research has demonstrated a tendency for parties to adopt positions that are relatively more extreme than their supporter mean positions, but there are at least two lines of argumentation (one based on coalition bargaining considerations, the other on vote maximization) that also imply the presence of relative moderation – a tendency for moderate parties to be more moderate than their supporters. Using surveys covering 31 countries compiled by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, this investigation shows that, despite the extraordinarily close correspondence between the two sets of positions, parties in coalitional systems do display both types of effect. Further investigation indicates that coalition maneuvering, rather than vote maximization, motivates this behavior. (xsd:string)
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  • (CSES) (xsd:string)
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  • CSES-Bibliography (xsd:string)
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  • 2007 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2007 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 40 (xsd:string)
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?:name
  • Relative Extremism and Relative Moderation: Strategic Party Positioning in Democratic Systems (xsd:string)
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  • inproceedings (xsd:string)
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  • 103rd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (xsd:string)
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  • Bibsonomy (xsd:string)
  • In 103rd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 40, 2007 (xsd:string)
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  • Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) (xsd:string)
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  • 2007 (xsd:string)
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  • 40 (xsd:string)
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