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This report on the relationship between inequality and youth radicalisation is written on the basis of statistical analysis of five cross-national population surveys, and two youth surveys. The primary purpose of this research was to examine associations between different forms of national and individual level inequality and social attitudes associated with far right and Islamist radicalisation among young people. While none of the questions available in multiple large-scale surveys can identify extremism or radicalisation directly, there are some that capture attitudes and opinions that we would expect far right and/or Islamist extremists to typically hold. These are Attitudes towards political violence; Antidemocratic attitudes, and Anti-Muslim attitudes. This report attempts to systematically analyse the relationship of these attitudes with demographic information, experiences and attitudes relevant for inequalities on the individual level and countrylevel variables relevant for inequalities on the macro-level. This is done in order to see whether these attitudes, proxies for cognitive radicalisation, are more common among people who have personal experience or perceptions of economic or social adversity, discrimination or feelings of injustice, or people from economically unequal countries. Most of the analysis is restricted to under 30-year olds, although we also do some comparative analyses. The secondary data analysis shows that there is no straightforward relationship between inequality and cognitive radicalisation, measured as support for political violence, opposition to democracy, and negative attitudes to Muslims. Most notably, income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient was not significant in any of the analyses. However, this does not mean that there is no relationship at all between inequality and attitudes associated with radicalisation. We find that indicators of individual level financial difficulty, as well as lower GDP, welfare expenditure and governance quality at the country level are predictors of some, but not all of the outcome variables. Moreover, as well as the previously documented perceived injustice, and experiences of discrimination, a sense of powerlessness is one of the most consistent factors across datasets. Perceived inequality and lack of control could increase group identity, which in turn can increase experienced horizontal inequality and radicalised narratives to frame and make sense of such experiences. However, it is important to note that this is only one of many possibilities. Mainstream groups, institutions and narrative could fulfil the same search for compensatory control, order and purpose as extremist movements. None of the variables in our models, can reliably distinguish between those who hold extremist attitudes and not, much less who acts on them. This difference, although it can be influenced by social and economic disadvantage, seems largely dependent on situational and idiosyncratic factors, and other unobserved and variables like personality and prior experience. It should also be noted that most of the relationships reported here are very weak, and this combined with the other limitations mentioned above, makes it difficult to extract any practical or policy implications, without considering the wider literature and research in more specific milieus of radicalisation.
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