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?:abstract
  • This paper analyzes the interplay between a nation's electoral system and the dimensionality of its politics using cross-national data covering several nations and a new measure of dimensionality. Restrictive electoral institutions provide incentives for parties to ignore or absorb emerging dimensions and are not well-suited for representing small societal groups. Alternatively, permissive systems make it worthwhile for parties to take positions along nascent political dimensions, often representative of minority interests. Thus, I predict that countries with permissive electoral systems will be characterized by high dimensional political constructs, while restrictive systems will conform well to a single dimension. To test this prediction, I estimate multiple models using CSES data from several nations and a new measure of political dimensionality. (xsd:string)
?:author
?:comment
  • (CSES) (xsd:string)
  • http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p267198_index.html (xsd:string)
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  • CSES-Bibliography (xsd:string)
?:dateModified
  • 2008 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2008 (xsd:gyear)
?:duplicate
?:fromPage
  • 37 (xsd:string)
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is ?:mainEntity of
?:name
  • Electoral Systems and Political Dimensionality (xsd:string)
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  • inproceedings (xsd:string)
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  • 104th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (xsd:string)
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  • Bibsonomy (xsd:string)
  • In 104th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 37, 2008 (xsd:string)
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  • Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) (xsd:string)
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  • 2008 (xsd:string)
  • CSES (xsd:string)
  • CSES_input2014 (xsd:string)
  • CSES_pro (xsd:string)
  • FDZ_IUP (xsd:string)
  • checked (xsd:string)
  • english (xsd:string)
  • inproceedings (xsd:string)
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  • 37 (xsd:string)
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