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  • As the practice of regular mass elections has become widespread, so have the instances of corrupt elections. Electoral corruption undercuts the crucial role of elections of enabling citizens to select, reward and punish rulers. I study the question, when are elections likely to be corrupt and when clean? The prevailing view is that, because electoral corruption is costly and risky, it is likely to be pursued when it can change who wins, namely in close elections; also, it is to be pursued only to the extent necessary to secure a victory, but not beyond that point. This view applies well enough to competitive democracies, but not to less-than-democratic electoral systems such as autocracies or dominant-party systems, where incumbents are substantially more powerful than other contenders. In fact, elections in such systems are often so corrupt as to yield overwhelming victories. In light of current ideas on electoral corruption this is puzzling: Why engage excessively in the costly practice of electoral corruption? I propose an answer based on the informational and reputational effects of electoral corruption. I elaborate two mechanisms through which powerful incumbents can benefit from electoral corruption. First, electoral corruption can inflate the margin of victory. In turn, high margins can deter future opposition turnout and coordination. Second, the belief that elections will be corrupt can deter opposition turnout directly. Using an original dataset with a new measure of electoral corruption for 88 countries in 1990-2000, I find strong evidence that electoral corruption and high margins of victory are associated with lower turnout. I use OLS, instumental variables, and matching estimators. I test the micro-level relationship between beliefs and turnout using a panel of electoral surveys, and find that the belief that elections are corrupt is strongly associated with a lower likelihood of voting. (xsd:string)
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  • http://www.stanford.edu/class/polisci353/2004fall/reading/Simpser%20-%20Making%20votes%20not%20count.pdf (xsd:string)
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  • 2004 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2004 (xsd:gyear)
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  • Making Votes Not Count: Strategic Incentives for Electoral Corruption (xsd:string)
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  • 45, 2004 (xsd:string)
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  • Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) (xsd:string)
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