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?:abstract
  • The late twentieth century has seen a resurgence of ethnic conflict in many states worldwide. In seeking the management and containment of such tensions, interest has increasingly turned to issues of ‘constitutional engineering’ or ‘institutional design’. One of the most important and influential claims in the literature is that proportional electoral systems are most appropriate for ethnic minority representation, promoting support for the political system, and therefore leading to conflict resolution in plural societies. But under what conditions do electoral rules shape the political support of different ethnic groups? Does this pattern vary according to the type of ethnonational, cultural-linguistic, racial, or ethnoreligious cleavage? Can we extend our generalizations from established democracies like Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland to plural societies in a wide range of transitional and consolidating democracies like the Ukraine, Romania and Taiwan? To explore these issues, this study examines patterns of support for the political system among ethnic minority populations under proportional, mixed and majoritarian systems in a dozen new and established democracies. Survey data is drawn from the second release of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. The preliminary results presented in this initial study remain subject to reanalysis in a wider range of democracies once more countries are added to this dataset. Nevertheless the initial findings indicate that there is a complex pattern at work and the claim that PR party list systems are automatically associated with higher levels of political support among ethnic minorities is not confirmed by the study. (xsd:string)
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  • 2002 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2002 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 206 (xsd:string)
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  • 0199246467 ()
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  • Ballots not Bullets: Testing the Consociational Theories of Ethnic Conflict, Electoral Systems and Democratization (xsd:string)
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  • incollection (xsd:string)
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  • The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy (xsd:string)
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  • In The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy, edited by Reynolds, Andrew, 206-247, Oxford University Press, 2002 (xsd:string)
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  • Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) (xsd:string)
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  • 247 (xsd:string)
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