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?:abstract
  • A classic reward-punishment model of economic voting (Key 1966; Goodhart and Bhansali 1970; Kramer 1971; Muller 1970) is a simple yet powerful tool to explain voting decisions. It holds that when voters find that an incumbent government has done a good job in controlling the state of the economy during its term, they vote for the incumbent government parties or candidates on election day, and when voters are not happy about the way that incumbents have handled the economy, they vote for the opposition parties or their candidates. Naturally, a large body of literature has developed under this topic since the model was first introduced. Many theories about the mechanism of economic voting, far more sophisticated than the original simple reward-punishment model, have been proposed and tested empirically... (xsd:string)
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  • 2009 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2009 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 193 (xsd:string)
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  • 9780199217359 ()
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  • Economic Voting: Do Institutions Affect the Way Voters Evaluate Incumbents? (xsd:string)
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  • incollection (xsd:string)
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  • The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (xsd:string)
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  • In The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, edited by Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, 193-219, Oxford University Press, 2009 (xsd:string)
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  • Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) (xsd:string)
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  • 2009 (xsd:string)
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  • 219 (xsd:string)
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