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  • A classic reward-punishment model of economic voting (Key 1966; Goodhart and Bhansali 1970; Kramer 1971; Muller 1970) is a simple yet powerful tool to explain voting decisions. It holds that when voters find that an incumbent government has done a good job in controlling the state of the economy during its term, they vote for the incumbent government parties or candidates on election day, and when voters are not happy about the way that incumbents have handled the economy, they vote for the opposition parties or their candidates. (xsd:string)
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  • 2000 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2000 (xsd:gyear)
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  • Economic Voting: Do Institutions Affect the Way Voters Evaluate Incumbents? (xsd:string)
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  • 18th World Congress of the International Political Science Association (xsd:string)
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  • In 18th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, 2000 (xsd:string)
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  • Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) (xsd:string)
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