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?:abstract
  • Declining levels of turnout and growing distrust in political elites are often seen as symptoms of a crisis of representative democracy. Various proposals of reform have been made to reinvigorate representation and political participation. This paper focuses on one aspect of that debate: finding an alternative to FPTP, which is the electoral rule most frequently used in single-member districts, but which is criticized, among others, for allowing only a limited expression of voters’ preferences. Many alternative rules have been suggested, such as Approval Voting, Majority Judgement, Range Voting, etc. The literature on these decision rules has concentrated on their formal properties. Yet, we know surprisingly little about how frequently these rules would lead to different outcomes in normal electoral settings. This paper improves our understanding of these rules by examining their mechanical effects. We start from data on voters’ party utilities from “real-world” settings, based mainly on CSES data. This allows simulating and comparing the outcomes of different electoral rules under a variety of distributions of voters’ party preferences. We determine how frequently these rules would select different winners and we analyze the contextual characteristics that are associated with more frequent divergences between pairs of rules. For the latter question, we focus on a number of party system or electorate’s characteristics, which have been highlighted in debates on challenges to representation (such as ideological polarization, party system fragmentation, or affective polarization). We also examine which types of parties are favored by specific electoral rules. (xsd:string)
?:author
?:comment
  • (CSES) (xsd:string)
?:dataSource
  • CSES-Bibliography (xsd:string)
?:dateModified
  • 2022 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2022 (xsd:gyear)
?:duplicate
is ?:hasPart of
?:inLanguage
  • english (xsd:string)
is ?:mainEntity of
?:name
  • Alternatives to FPTP in Single-Winner Elections: When Do They Make a Difference? (xsd:string)
?:publicationType
  • inproceedings (xsd:string)
?:reference
?:sourceCollection
  • American Political Science Association (APSA) (xsd:string)
?:sourceInfo
  • Bibsonomy (xsd:string)
  • In American Political Science Association (APSA), 2022 (xsd:string)
?:studyGroup
  • Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) (xsd:string)
?:tags
  • 2022 (xsd:string)
  • CSES (xsd:string)
  • CSES_input2022 (xsd:string)
  • CSES_pro (xsd:string)
  • FDZ_IUP (xsd:string)
  • english (xsd:string)
  • inproceedings (xsd:string)
  • transfer22 (xsd:string)
rdf:type