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?:abstract
  • In practice, we often observe parties sending out coalition signals during election campaigns. In this paper we present a simple model that allows to directly estimate the effect of coalition signals on individual voting decisions. Using unique survey - experiments in two different countries we find that coalition signals have an indirect effect on a voter’s decision - calculus through changing the relative weights in a voters’ utility function. Coalition signals increase the importance of coalition considerations and, at the same time, decrease the importance of party considerations in the way voters make-up their mind. (xsd:string)
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  • (GLES) (xsd:string)
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  • GLES-Bibliography (xsd:string)
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  • 4. Fassung, Februar 2015 (xsd:gyear)
?:dateModified
  • 2013 (xsd:gyear)
?:datePublished
  • 2013 (xsd:gyear)
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  • How Coalition Signals Influence Voting Behavior (xsd:string)
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  • inproceedings (xsd:string)
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?:sourceCollection
  • 3. Annual General Conference of the European Political Science Association (EPSA) (xsd:string)
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  • Bibsonomy (xsd:string)
  • In 3. Annual General Conference of the European Political Science Association (EPSA), 2013 (xsd:string)
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  • 20.06.-22.06.2013 (xsd:gyear)
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  • German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) (xsd:string)
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  • 2013 (xsd:string)
  • FDZ_Wahlen (xsd:string)
  • GLES (xsd:string)
  • GLES_input2014 (xsd:string)
  • GLES_pro (xsd:string)
  • GLES_version4 (xsd:string)
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  • inproceedings (xsd:string)
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