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  • This study examines individual heterogeneity in performance voting due to political sophistication and salience. Building on two recently developed theoretical perspectives – heterogeneous attribution and heterogeneous information – we test whether low sophisticated voters reward or punish incumbents more strongly for past performance than the highly sophisticated or whether, as the heterogeneous information argument expects, the opposite is true. Secondly, we expect performance voting to be stronger when voters attach a high degree of salience to a particular policy field. Utilizing crossnational data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) including 26 democracies, we examine these expectations, and explore how political sophistication and salience attached to a policy area mediate performance voting across an array of policy fields including the economy, social welfare, immigration and national security. Our findings provide empirical support for our expectations and are in line with a heterogeneous information perspective: performance voting increases with political sophistication, but the sophistication gap narrows as voters view a policy field as more important. This suggests that the degree of salience voters attach to certain policy outcomes offsets the informational costs of performance voting. (xsd:string)
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?:comment
  • http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12033. (CSES) (xsd:string)
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  • CSES-Bibliography (xsd:string)
?:dateModified
  • 2012 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2012 (xsd:gyear)
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  • Holding Governments Accountable: Individual Heterogeneity in Performance Voting (xsd:string)
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  • inproceedings (xsd:string)
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  • Elections, Public Opinion and Parties (EPOP) Conference (xsd:string)
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  • Bibsonomy (xsd:string)
  • In Elections, Public Opinion and Parties (EPOP) Conference, 2012 (xsd:string)
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  • Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) (xsd:string)
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  • 2012 (xsd:string)
  • CSES (xsd:string)
  • CSES_input2014 (xsd:string)
  • CSES_pro (xsd:string)
  • FDZ_IUP (xsd:string)
  • Government_Accountability (xsd:string)
  • Individual_Heterogeneity (xsd:string)
  • Performance_Voting (xsd:string)
  • Performance_Voting,CSES (xsd:string)
  • Political_Sophistication_&_Salience. (xsd:string)
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  • inproceedings (xsd:string)
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