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  • Despite the impressive amount of empirical research on lobbying, a fundamental question remains overlooked. How do interest groups choose to lobby different sides of an issue? We argue that how groups choose sides is a function of firm-level economic activity. By studying a highly salient regulatory issue, the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and using a novel data set of lobbying activities, we reveal that a group’s main economic sector matters most. Firms operating in finance and retail face unique costs and are incentivised to lobby against the GDPR. However, these groups are outgunned by a large, heterogeneous group of firms with superior lobbying firepower on the other side of the issue. (xsd:string)
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  • https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X18000223. (Eurobarometer) (xsd:string)
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  • 2019 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 2019 (xsd:gyear)
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  • 10.1017/S0143814X18000223 ()
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  • Choosing lobbying sides: the General Data Protection Regulation of the European Union (xsd:string)
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  • In Journal of Public Policy, 39(4), 543564, 2019 (xsd:string)
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  • 39 (xsd:string)